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Abstract
Talking about resistance means raising the question of
opposition, of denying all attempts at neutralizing opposites,
which would be typical of ideological construction, either
political or aesthetic.  This essay investigates the meaning and
the reasons of resistance according to a theoretical, aesthetic,
and cultural point of view.  The thesis is that resistance has to
be considered as an articulation of difference, and that means
following a different logic of thought, no longer rigid or
monolithic but plural, like a new grammar, syntax, and
practice of creativity, challenge, provocation, multiplicity, and
pluralism.  In this sense the aesthetics of resistance is an art
of difference, the capability of creating cultural formations that
provide elegance and refinement.
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1. Resistance and the question of opposites
What do we mean when we talk about resistance?  Considering
resistance requires, first and foremost, finding the right words
and concepts for doing so.  Thus when we speak of resistance,
the question we must ask ourselves is how to contemplate
opposition?  To speak of resistance is indeed to raise the
problem of opposites, which in turn means responding to the
problem of conflict.
If we begin with the recognition that opposition does indeed
exist, a recognition that denies all attempts at neutralizing
opposites, which would be typical of all ideological
construction, either political or aesthetic,[1] we must
recognize that, faced with society’s growing complex
processes, opposition can no longer be thought of in traditional
terms or according to past perspectives.  This means that it
can no longer be contemplated according to classical logic
related to the concepts of identity, which does not recognize
the existence of the other, of the heterogeneous, and of the
distinct.  But neither can it be considered from the dialectic
point of view, still dominant in the twentieth century, that is
based on the concept of contradiction:  the battle of opposites
would lead to overcoming conflict through dialectical
contraposition between positive and negative.
So if the logic of identity and dialectic logic are now excluded,
and even the logic of so-called polarity in which opposites are
considered entities presupposing and sustaining each other
reciprocally, four other fundamental perspectives, each distinct
and irreconcilable, can be characterized.  All e of these
propose ways of contemplating opposition and present several
other theoretical answers to the problem of opposites.
In short, the first position contemplates the problem of oppo-
sites by reducing conflict, by pacifying and harmonizing
opponents.  This is the typical solution of the aesthetic
tradition, which always seeks to reconcile opposites,
overcoming all conflict, and which is found today in discourses
that propose to rediscover and rehabilitate notions of beauty
and harmony.[2]  A second position, on the contrary, proposes
making opposites radical and conflict extreme.  In the
aesthetic field this is manifested by appealing to notions of the
sublime, giving rise to what we could call a kind of aesthetics
of terror.[3]  A third position, on the other hand, moves
towards the relativization and the problematizing of opposites,
towards a presentation of the terms of conflict based on irony
and masking.  This is the course considered “postmodern” by
many, which has distinct exponents and representatives all
over the world.[4]  Finally, a fourth position is one that could
be based on the notion of difference, which contemplates
opposites in a non-symmetrical, non-dialectical, non-polar
way, through the concepts of acuteness and provocation.
Without entering into the individual merits of these situations,
each having its own virtues and defects, the only one that
appears open to an effective experience of conflict is that
which allows for contemplating opposites, and therefore
resistance, as the articulation of difference.  But what does it
mean to understand resistance as the articulation of the
difference?
2. The articulation of the difference
First of all, resistance goes in the opposite direction of
aesthetic conciliation.  It moves towards an experience of
conflict larger than dialectic contradiction, towards the
exploration of opposition between terms not symmetrically
polar to each other.  Hence, resistance presupposes a logic of
difference understood as non-identity, as dissimilarity larger
than the logical concept of diversity and the dialectic of
distinction.  So then, as we know, it has been characteristic of
poststructuralist and postmodern thought to add the question
of the difference to the agenda of theoretical and political
debate.  The topic of difference is one of the most important
results we have inherited from these thought experiences, and
which we can still apply today in the arena of contemporary
reflection.
In its best theorization, and here I think specially of Jean-
François Lyotard,[5] one must recognize that postmodernism
has left us with the tendency of attuning our sensibility to
differences, honing our capacity to accept the undetermined,
the shapeless, the immense.  It has accustomed us to resist
simplification, the banal, the univocal, while instilling in us the
pleasure of incessant search, of continued shifting of horizons
of hope; in short, it has opened up to us the channels of
plurality, multiplicity, difference.  Thanks to postmodernism we
have learned to mistrust everything from indubitable
certainties, absolute principles, and essentialist and totalizing
visions, to univocal and comforting answers.
Understood as siding oneself with a distinct logic of thought,
no longer monolithic but rather plural, nonlinear and
discontinuous, following transversal paths, we must then
recognize that postmodernity from now on, with its logic of
difference and plurality, represents an irrefutable cultural
conquest.
3. Witz and agudezas as substitute formations
But today, with a new millennium already under way, it
appears we are escorting something paradoxical.  On the one
hand we have an inflation of the Other and, consequently on
the other band, a reification of its concept.  For example,
within the framework of the political, as seen from the
European geographical standpoint, the rightwingers of
xenophobic tendencies assume their role as carriers of ideas of
difference by celebrating their diversity, specificity, and
exalting them excessively, never negating them.  Take the
case, for example, of the diffusion of the so-called Front
National in France, of the PVV of Geert Wilders in the
Netherlands, and in my own country, Italy, of the Lega Nord
(Northern League).[6]  In all these cases, and we could add
many others, we are obviously dealing with reactionary
positions resulting in a process of essentializing difference. 
Differences of identity are rendered absolute by connecting
them to the exaltation of national, regional, provincial, and
local parameters, to the vindication of petty individualist,
egotistic, and partial interests.  We find ourselves, hence, face
to face with ideas of difference that are absolutely ideological,
determinist, discriminatory and intrinsically xenophobic, as
well as carriers of exclusion and division on all levels.
Therefore, confronted with this essentialist idea of difference,
the temptation of resuming the old idea of identity, of
uniqueness, not in shades but rather pure, clear, and distinct,
is implied.  However, we must resist this temptation and still
bet in favor of difference that can be reduced to neither a
deliberate nor generic invitation with respect to, and in
tolerance of, diversity.  The idea of difference is truly too
important to leave in the hands of the new ideologues circu-
lating today, or in those of so many old diehards of various
forms of supremacy (white, Occidental, male, etc.).
In the light of the challenges of our time, faced with
predominating forms of singular thought, of a new global order
extending from economics to politics, from religion to society,
confronted above all with communication imposing itself as an
informative ideal in every sector of social and cultural life as
manifested in the tendency to conform with the model of the
publicity message, with the attitude of simplifying and
lightening content, of confirming and flattering all levels of
mediocrity and vulgarity and thus revealing the true
oppressive and mystifying nature of communication, it remains
indispensable to affirm the principle of difference, to activate
forms of resistance, and to develop strategies of opposition.
It would be absurd, however, to oppose these currently
prevailing tendencies, which for many constitute the
unobtainable horizon towards the future, in favor of forms of
conservation or nostalgia for a now unrecoverable past.  This
resistance cannot simply be expressed in terms of negativity,
much less of universality; rather, it would have a specific,
determined function, it would be at once different, plural,
contingent, and propositional.  Its differential movement must
not mean nostalgia, rejection, or resignation but rather
transformation and transfer.  In this way, resistance does not
mean inertia or defending the status quo; it is a slower and
quasi-imperceptible but continuous and insistent movement of
transformation, of differentiation between levels and reality.
With respect to a purely transgressive or nihilistic vision of
resistance, typical of not only the vitalism of the seventies but
also of negative thought that thinks only in terms of negativity
and head-on contraposition, or with respect to a prophetic
vision that focuses its attention too far on the future and thus
renounces the moment in question, we lack an insistence on
active and present forms of resistance, multiple and
differentiated, in the personal place of the contender, and
renouncing all totalizing will of authority and violence.
The resistance we are thinking about rejects taking an
apocalyptic or visionary position, but at the same time it
avoids being watered down to the level of surrendering to the
society of spectacle and generalized communication in which
we live.  Resistance cannot fall into the naïveté of head-on
confrontation with the enemy in which “the illness of the
chains,” as Nietzsche called it, is perpetuated.  We cannot be
naive to the point of believing that we can defeat the
adversary so easily, much less conciliate or even think of
changing places with him.  It is no longer a time of exalted
mystics or prophets of misfortune but of courageous thinkers
who know how to differentiate between conservation and
transfer, between immobilization and transformation, tactics
and effectiveness.
What is lacking today is solid but subtle thinking, fluid but
resistant, ingenious but not absent-minded.  It is a thinking
that is capable of submerging us in the flow of the current
while at the same time always distinguishing between levels,
transferring essentially distinct, different messages.  To this
end, it would perhaps be convenient to remember the
teachings of Walter Benjamin who, although believing himself
deprived of illusions with respect to his era, spoke
unreservedly in favor of it.  The attitude the modern resistant
should have is therefore that of a remote interest, a kind of
trusting disenchantment, of skeptical admiration that puts it in
direct contact with the present, with its transformations,
without otherwise leaving us frightened, much less dazzled.
However, considered far from the logic of identity and contra-
diction, difference is not understood as an absolute
foreignness, like radical transgression that frequently, as
alternative and speculative behavior, is functional to the very
system and ends up re-enforcing it.  Lacan and Derrida have
taught us otherwise:  we can never truly find the other, the
different, without domesticating it, incorporating it, reducing it
in some way to the same.[7]  The work of difference is really
a differential movement that incites us to deconstruct the
illusion of a pure theory of alterity and of difference,[8] and
instead to contemplate a kind of foreign familiarity, an
ambivalence that inextricably unites identity and alterity, the
inherent and the foreign.
The model for this foreign familiarity could come from the field
of psychoanalysis and be traced, for example, back to so-
called “substitute formations” of which Freud speaks.  In fact,
Freud refers to the aesthetic category of Witz, or acuteness,
as the formation or establishment of a substitute between
terms strongly opposing one another because of the true
difference existing between them.[9]  Acuteness is thus the
aesthetic mode for contemplating difference, and it makes
room for cultural productions endowed with great fineness in
which opposites are contemplated in a non-symmetrical way.
 They are recognized and maintained in their alterity without
being conciliated, annulled, assimilated, or converted one into
the other.  For this reason difference is an art; it is the product
of the subtle, the capacity for contemplating formations with
great fineness and acuteness.
In the context of an Occidental aesthetic, together with the
idea of beauty as harmony, symmetry, and conciliation,[10]
that is, the classic idea of beauty, there has, as well, always
existed a diverse, alternative idea, a strategic idea of beauty
thought of as the experience of opposites and as challenges. 
The aesthetic of difference finds its very roots sunk in antiquity
and the Baroque age.  Think, on the one hand, of Heraclitus,
who even in antiquity proposed the idea of the fight between
opponents as the principle governing all things.  And, on the
other hand, think of Baltasar Gracián, who, in the seventeenth
century, the Golden Century of Spanish culture, theorized
about the notion of acuteness, understanding it to be a
“decoding” attitude penetrating the depths of the real to
subvert the natural order, therefore discovering acute and
efficient, strategic and refined, forms of beauty.[11]  These
ideas met up again later in some theories of twentieth-century
avant-garde movements, such as the Surrealists, who
proclaimed not to know how to handle the idea of beauty
contemplated as balance and harmony, and for this reason
they proposed that “beauty will be convulsive or it will not be”
(Breton).
4. Challenge and provocation
In light of these considerations, the idea of resistance as
difference cannot but assume the traces of an experience of
challenge and provocation.  But what is understood by these
terms?  At the heart of the theory of challenge, over and
above all else, is the abandonment of an organic and totalizing
idea of society, as well as all theory of social equilibrium. 
Society, even more so today, is not something static or
monolithic.  What makes it move is not the harmonious desire
of pacification and consensus but instead of conflict, that is, an
incessant fight for individual and collective recognition.[12]  A
few recent critical philosophical theories make evident these
very aspects.[13]  Furthermore, distinct from transgression,
which presents itself as a moment of rejection, of deviation
from the norm, thus maintaining a dialectical relation with the
very thing it tries to distance itself from, challenge moves in a
different terrain and entails another appreciation of its
contenders and its own role with respect to the symmetry
between them.
In the wake of the “Sensation” artists, what is presented today
as an example in the field of contemporary art appears
perfectly placed in the environment of searching for
transgression, in the wake of the already-spent transgression
of the avant-gardes.[14]  Apart from this, such art, now
canonized and fashionable, is born of specific commissions
from the media and publicity worlds seeking only to propagate
their own ideology.  This art does nothing more than form a
functional expression of the system, perfectly integrated in the
logic of the dominant market.  In it, there is no true challenge,
no real provocation.
In addition, the challenge alone is no longer sufficient, for it
still requires the conflict to be understood as a kind of duel
between opposite and symmetrical entities, and it demands,
furthermore, an appeal to a new system of norms for
regulating future competition.  Only with provocation do we
situate ourselves, from the very beginning, in a terrain
different from that of the adversary.  Between us and the
adversary a radical asymmetry is established, a difference, like
that which exists, for example, between conscience and
unconsciousness.  In this provocation, what is important is the
perturbing effect of "uncanniness" (Unheimlichkeit) obtained
when appealing to something that has remained latent in the
adversary, and which he or she cannot manifest without its
force appearing to be destroyed.
In this dimension, when we consider the ideas of challenge
and provocation, we cannot help but think of the way the two
are interpreted in dandyism, for example.  This is on the
condition, however, that all traces be eliminated from this
phenomenon that would make it simply an expression of a
decadent sensibility or a form of aestheticism.[15]  However,
before the environment in which the dandy moved was that of
the world, the terrain of everyday life, what Baudelaire called
la vie modern.[16]  Here the dandy immediately situated
himself in an alternative manner, valorizing those strategies of
behavior and action different and foreign from the dominant
logic.
The dandy cannot keep this up if there is no measure of
challenge.  His entire existence is devoted to nothing but
continuously challenging the constituted order.  His essential
provocation is his distancing, his absolute exteriority,
converting himself into nothing and no one in order to adhere
fully to his time and to the reality of things.  The dandy there-
fore bets on difference and the unpredictability of the historic
process.  In this sense there follows a paradoxical strategy, a
kind of politics of the impossible that is supported by the
unpredictable, by collision, by the hidden complicities it can
arouse.  The result is not guaranteed but, more important, this
is not essential.  It is not the conquest for power or riches that
drives the dandy.  His succeeds result to the extent that he
succeeds in provoking reaction and igniting imagination by his
ability to resuscitate stupor and evoke admiration.  If life is
nothing but fight and conflict, what moves the dandy to action
is a constant sense of challenge understood as a dangerous
experience to which we must continually expose ourselves.
5. The intellectuals and the grain of sand
Challenges, provocations, and examinations do nothing now
but delineate an aesthetics of resistance.  This is understood
as the practice of difference, which is before all else a cultural
practice, a practice of contemplation that vindicates once and
for all an effective dimension of knowing.  So that what
appears to impose itself with force is a new figure of the
intellectual, certainly not in the traditional meaning of the
organic intellectual, but rather in a more fluid and blatant
sense of the term.[17]
I believe that today there is no reason to be embarrassed by
this word.  On the contrary, we must reaffirm the centrality of
the intellectual presence, claim its autonomy with strength. 
Its meaning, today, should be such that he who presents a
challenge to society, to the world, finds grounds in everyday
life and carries forward a contrasting idea of culture, keeping
alive the knowledge-power bond inherent in all theory.[18]
The conditions for this to happen are, nonetheless, that
intellectuals keep their distance from both the conformity and
academism of institutional thinkers as well as from the
sectarianism and extremism of outsiders.  Generally, what the
former lack is the emotional energy, and the latter, the
realistic perception of cultural dynamics.
In fact, today it happens that, on the one hand, knowledge
has become bureaucratized to such an extent that it has
systematized so much into a guaranteed order, making it
almost impossible to give recognition to anyone not organic to
this same logic.  On the other hand, the organization of culture
and the regimentation of public meaning have become so
strong and ramified that they make even dissent irrelevant. 
This situation could nevertheless be overcome if we would only
realize that today, more than ever, we find ourselves before a
common enemy represented by the hegemony of the market
and by the predomination of the one and only logic of profit. 
Thus, facing a common enemy, we must develop a common
front.  Both institutional thinkers as well as outsiders must
understand they are producers of goods, cultural and symbolic
goods, that pertain to an economy distinct from the dominant
one, and it is in the interest of both to safeguard the
autonomy of this environment.[19]
In his final works Pierre Bourdieu strongly maintained that, at
this time of the worst economic globalization, we should
oppose the denationalized internationalism of men and women
in culture.  We should do this by resisting kitsch products of
globalization in the name of values connected with exercising
free, autonomous, disinterested activity.[20]  This implies
freely and seriously developing one’s own intellectual work by
rigorously analyzing what surrounds us, and consider how
each of us can contribute to unmasking the dominant ideology
and resist its triumph over us.  Here, we are participating in
the operation of throwing a “grain of sand in the well-greased
cogwheels of resigned complicities.”[21]  It could sound naive
today, but it seems the only thing to do.
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